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Introduction
Home renovation is generally asserted to be a highly effective means for households to lower expenditures on energy through increased efficiency. From a public policy perspective, energy efficiency in the residential sector confers the additional benefit of reducing reliance on fossil fuels, thereby contributing to both energy security and environmental stewardship. In Germany, as in other industrialized countries, the residential sector accounts for upwards of 30% of energy end use, the overwhelming share of which is consumed for space heating and hot water preparation. Consequently, the improvement of home insulation and heating equipment in the existing building stock, which directly impacts the energy required for heating services, is seen to afford considerable scope for reducing the country's energy consumption.
Over the past decade, the German government has implemented several finan- (Train 1994) . Despite its relevance to the assessment of publicly-financed programs, WTP estimates for energy-savings and the associated implications for free-ridership have received scant scrutiny to date.
The purpose of the present study is twofold. First, we estimate the determinants of home retrofits and derive therefrom estimates of the marginal WTP for energy savings. Second, we assess the extent to which free rider effects threaten 4 to undermine the social benefits of the subsidization program. These objectives are pursued using a unique data set of some 2530 owners of German single-family homes, which combines real investment cost for 16 retrofit measures, engineering estimates of the respective energy savings, and information on wage and material costs along with the sociodemographic characteristics of the sampled households.
Our work builds on a handful of earlier studies of household energy consumption behavior, most of which draw on data obtained from surveys in the U.S.
With respect to home retrofits, Cameron (1985) was among the first to analyze household choice behavior using a nested logit model. She finds that income, relative energy prices, and retrofit prices are the key determinants of demand for conservation retrofits. Subsequent studies using U.S. household survey data have extended this line of inquiry in a number of directions, including analyses that address the effectiveness of energy conservation programs (Hartman 1988) , the effects of changes in energy prices on the consumption of housing, residential energy, and other goods (Quigley and Rubinfeld 1989) , and the extent to which homeowners apply high discount rates to home-improvement opportunities (Metcalf and Hassett 1999) . Among the few studies of this issue from the European context, Banfi et al. (2008) estimate household's marginal willingnessto-pay using an innovative stated choice experiment conducted among a sample of Swiss apartment tenants and homeowners. Their estimates, obtained from a multinominal logit model, suggest the importance of both energy savings as well as comfort benefits as determinants of retrofit choices.
Although publicly financed programs to encourage energy conservation are increasingly common in industrialized countries, only a few studies have investigated the magnitude of free rider effects. Joskow and Marron (1992) and Eto et al. (1995) conduct a meta-analysis of free ridership by surveying evaluations of demand-side management (DSM) programs conducted by U.S. utilities. With respect to residential programs, the authors uncover a wide range of estimates, varying from zero to up to 50% of free riders. However, most of the reviewed eval-5 uations are based on simple survey questions that ask the respondents whether they would have hypothetically reached the same decision in absence of the DSM program. Due to the nature of these questions, the calculated free rider share may therefore be susceptible to a hypothetical-or response bias.
1 Malm (1996) circumvents these difficulties by analyzing the revealed choice of high efficiency heating system purchases among different clusters of consumers. He derives an impressive share of 89% of households that would have bought the efficient equipment even in the absence of a subsidy.
The present paper illustrates an alternative approach for quantifying freeriding by combining revealed preference data with cost estimates derived from engineering calculations. Our method is similar to Cameron's (1985) in that nests are imposed to capture correlation of the utility across alternatives, but, rather than using the nested logit model, we employ an analog thereof that involves the specification of an error-components structure (Brownstone and Train 1999) .
We additionally allow for heterogeneous preferences by specifying household specific random parameters, closely following Revelt and Train's (1998) analysis of the willingness-to-pay for lower operating costs of household appliances. Our investigation uncovers a potential free-rider share of up to 50% of the sampled households, substantially lower than Malm's (1996) estimates but still sufficiently high to warrant scrutiny of financial support for renovations.
The paper is outlined as follows. After a brief description of the data, Section 2 discusses the challenges of accommodating unobserved heterogenity in a discrete choice framework and describes alternative models derived from random utility theory for addressing them. Section 3 catalogues the empirical results and uses these to derive household-specific estimates of marginal willingness-to-pay. These results are used to draw policy implications with respect to free-rider problems in the context of Germany's current grants scheme. Section 4 concludes. (Ioannides 2002) . As a consequence of these considerations, there might exist preference heterogeneity concerning the attributes of a retrofit, leading in turn to heteroegeneity with respect to the household's expected net benefits and hence WTP for energy-saving measures.
We accommodate such heterogeneity by employing econometric models that afford broad coverage of the determinants -both observable and unobservable -of the individual household's utility from alternative retrofitting options.
Discrete Choice Models
Random utility theory provides a suitable framework for our analysis, as it predicts choices by comparing the utility associated with distinct retrofitting alternatives. Each household faces a choice set C with K elements. The utility U ij of household i for alternative j ∈ C comprises a deterministic and a stochastic component:
(1)
with V ij = α j + X ij β as representative utility, determined by the alternative specific constant α j and the matrix X ij , which captures alternative-specific attributes (e.g. costs) as well as characteristics of the household (e.g. income). The portion of utility that is unobservable to the researcher is represented by ij .
Household i chooses alternative j if and only if U ij > U ik for all k = j, with j, k ∈ C. The probability P i (j) of selecting j from the set of alternatives is thus dependent on ij and is equal to:
Assuming the error terms to be identically and independently (iid) distributed as Gumbel (or Type I extreme value), the resulting probability model is logistic, giving rise to the well-known conditional logit model (see e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985), with choice probabilities equal to:
One drawback of this model is its imposition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, requiring that when one alternative is removed from the choice set C, the choice probabilities of the remaining alternatives rise by the same proportion. This assumption is, in particular, violated when the error 8 terms are not independent, as is the case when there are subsets of alternatives for which unobserved shocks have concomitant effects. For example, those renovation alternatives involving roof and façade insulation may be associated with high levels of noise and dirt, thereby having a common adverse effect on utility. On the other hand, these same alternatives and possibly others may positively affect utility by contributing to social standing. Hence, each retrofit option may belong to several sets of alternatives that have a common effect on utility. Following Brownstone and Train (1998) , one can account for such groupings of similar sets of alternatives -and thereby relax the IIA assumption -by imposing a particular correlation structure on the utility of the alternatives via the addition of an error component:
where ψ is a normally distributed random parameter with zero mean, and µ j is a dummy variable which equals one if a certain latent effect is present in the utility of alternative j. Hence, the random quantity ψ only enters the utility of alternatives that share this effect.
2 Although the iid assumption for the 's still holds, the utility of the respective alternatives are correlated via the unobserved portion of utility η :
Incorporating this latent effect into Equation (3) yields the error-component logit model: Another drawback of the conditional logit model (3) is that it does not allow for taste variation, meaning that any household specific deviation from the meansample taste would enter into the unobserved part of utility ij . In the present application, this would preclude the possibility that households exhibit different responses to the determinants of retrofitting alternatives. An appropriate method
to deal with such heterogeneity in adoption behavior is to allow for household specific coefficients β i = (β + u i ), with u i as a household specific deviation from the sample meanβ, such that β exhibits a distribution across the sample of households. This gives rise to the random-parameter logit model:
Equation (7) is a generalization of Equation (3) as it estimates not only the mean coefficient but the parameters of the underlying distribution for those coefficients that are specified as random (Train 2003) . For example, if a random parameter β is assumed be normally distributed in the population, the random-parameter logit model estimates the mean and standard deviation of β. The coefficients can thus vary across observations, thereby accounting for taste variations with respect to the attributes of the available retrofitting alternatives. In this way, some parts of the unobserved heterogeneity inherent in the conditional logit model can be removed (Hensher and Greene 2003) .
The random-parameter logit fully relaxes the IIA property and additionally allows for any correlation structure between the utility of different alternatives.
If the representation of a particular correlation pattern is deemed important, the random-parameter logit can also be specified using the error components described above. As discussed by Koppelman and Bhat (2006) , this more flexible approach captures both heterogeneous preferences and complex correlation pat-terns by layering the error components on top of the random-parameter logit model.
Specification of Utility
Recognizing the preceding discussion about heterogeneous adoption behavior, we assume that the household's utility V ij is negatively effected by the investment cost C ij , and positively effected by the decline of the building's annual primary energy demand ∆Q ij , measured in megawatt hours (MWh), both of which are associated with a specific retrofitting alternative j. We control for the economic background of the households by including annual disposable income into the analysis.
3 Further, we expect that the level of the household's energy consumption influences the decision of whether to renovate, either positively because a household with a high energy consumption level is more inclined to lower its energy cost, or negatively because a high level reflects low energy awareness.
Moreover, because there is a quality differential between the building stocks in western and eastern Germany, a binary variable indicates whether the household lives in the eastern part of Germany. Finally, we include a measure of the accessibility of information on home retrofits within the immediate vicinity of the household. This variable is intended to proxy for the transaction costs of information acquisition, and is defined as the relative availability of certified home auditors within a 20 kilometer radius of the household's location. 3 As is typical for survey data, information on income is missing for a large share of the households -roughly 20%. To impute these missing values, we employ the expectationmaximization algorithm recommended by King et al. (2001) . The employed algorithm can be implemented using a program compatible with the statistical software R, and is downloadable from http://gking.harvard.edu. 4 To derive this measure we drew upon a list of certified home auditors and their addresses published by the German government. We read the data as a map-layer into a Geographical Information System and overlaid this with a layer of household locations. We then created a circular buffer around each household having a radius of 20 kilometers and generated a count
We choose the conditional logit model as empirical point of departure, and explore the implications of re-estimating the model using three alternative discrete choice models: the conditional logit model with error components, the random parameters logit model, and error components layered over the random parameters logit model, our most flexible model. The specification of utility in the most general form is:
where α is a constant that is specific to alternative j, C ij is the investment cost of household i for alternative j, and ∆Q ij is the respective energy-savings variable, computed as the difference in the building's annual primary energy demand in response to retrofit j. 5 The vector z z z i· = {income, energy consumption, information access, east} contains the household-specific characteristics that enter utility via interaction effects with investment cost and energy savings. Details on data assembly for cost and energy savings are given in the appendix. Table   1 presents an overview of the data, including a listing of the 16 options and the corresponding average costs and energy savings. The random parameters β i1 = (β 1 + u i1 ) for investment cost and β i2 = (β 2 + u i2 ) for energy savings, as well as the error components
), h ∈ {1, 2}, are only present in the random-parameters and error components logit models, respectively. For of auditors within this buffer. As a final step, we divided this count by the number of homes (excluding apartment complexes) within the buffer. The variable thus created serves to capture the relative availability of expert guidance on retrofits within the vicinity of the household. 5 It is important to emphasize that because such savings accumulate over the lifetime of the retrofit, the value of ∆Q ij is not equivalent to the energy spot price of a MWh, but rather will depend on several household-specific attributes, including time preference and expectations about future energy prices. example, if u i1 = u i2 = 0 for all households i, and σ 2 ψ1 = σ 2 ψ2 = 0, then Equation (8) collapses to the conditional logit specification.
In specifying the error components ψ h , the aim was to capture latent effects specific to an outcome or a set of outcomes. We explored several alternatives, guided by the considerations noted above concerning both the hidden costs and benefits of, respectively, grime and prestige associated with particular retrofit options. The presented specification follows closely Cameron's (1985) nested logit analysis by incorporating two error components, the first of which distinguishes the binary decision concerning whether to retrofit, and the second of which groups 13 of the remaining retrofit combinations that tend to produce annoying levels of dirt and disarray (indicated in the final column of Table 1 ). We also explored models with additional error components for alternatives conferring prestige, but 13 found these to yield no significant improvements to the model fit.
6
In the random parameters logit model, we allow for taste heterogeneity -even after controlling for the effects of the interaction variables contained in z z z -by treating the coefficients of cost and ∆Q as random. Alternative distributions can be availed for capturing heterogeneity, the most common of which are the normal and log-normal. The latter, being bounded on the left by zero, is particularly useful when theory suggests that the coefficient has the same sign for every decision-maker, as is the case here for the expected negative and positive coefficients of cost and ∆Q. The drawback of the lognormal -shared with the normal -is that its long tail can produce unreasonably large coefficients for some share of the observations. We consequently follow Revelt and Train (2000) and Hensher and Greene (2003) in specifying β 1 and β 2 as triangular distributed.
The triangular distribution has the form of a tent, peaking in the center at the mean and dropping off linearly on both sides of the center to form a density. It is possible to restrict the triangular distribution to yield coefficients of the same sign for all observations, but this restriction was found to be unnecessary with the present data.
As conditional and error component logit both have closed form solutions, they can be estimated using maximum likelihood. The random parameters logit, by contrast, requires that the integral in equation (7) be approximated by means of simulation using random draws from the mixing distribution (Train 2003) . To this end, we employ a Halton sequence to draw realizations from the population triangular distribution. We tested the sensitivity of the parameter estimates with different numbers of Halton draws per observation and found the results to be stable with as few as 100 draws. 
Results
In this section we present the results of the discrete choice models. The section begins with a cataloging of the coefficient estimates followed by a comparison of model fit. Thereafter we derive the marginal WTP and present its distribution over households. The section closes with a discussion of free-ridership and policy implications. Table 2 presents the results of a conditional-, random parameters-, error components, and error components with random parameters logit model. All four models tell a consistent story. The signs of the significant coefficients are the same across models and are of similar magnitude, depending on whether error components are present. The key effects pertaining to investment cost and energy savings have the expected positive and negative effect on utility, respectively, and are highly significant. Because the standard deviations for the parameter distributions of these two coefficients are statistically insignificant (i.e. u i1 = u i2 = 0 ∀i), there is no empirical evidence for taste heterogeneity beyond the variation that is captured by the interaction effects.
Coefficient Estimates and Model Fit
The results of these interaction terms must be interpreted with respect to the coefficients of C ij and ∆Q ij . For example, increasing energy consumption is seen to attenuate both the negative effect of cost and the positive effect of energy savings, which is consistent with the intuition that high energy-consuming households are less responsive to changes in energy expenditures. Likewise, the error components variants of the model indicate that access to information, as measured by the relative availability of certified auditors within a 20 kilometer radius of the household, has a dampening effect on the negative influence of cost that is of roughly the same magnitude as energy consumption. Income, on the other hand, exacerbates the negative influence of costs. An explanation for this finding is not immediately forthcoming, other than to speculate that wealthier households may be more aware of other, more profitable investment opportunities than housing. Finally, households living in the eastern part of Germany experience less disutility from the investment cost than their western counterparts. This result is expected, since the East-German building sector was in dire need of rehabilitation before reunification. This led in the 1990s to an extensive wave of refurbishment on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.
Regarding the question of model fit, a comparison of the log-likelihoods suggests that little is gained from the incorporation of heterogeneous preferences using the random parameters logit, an unsurprising finding given the insignifi-cance of the parameter distributions.
7 By contrast, the partitioning of the choice set using the error components appears to be an essential model specification.
Not only is the standard deviation on "annoying" alternatives highly significant, indicating that the utilities of the respective retrofit alternatives are correlated, but there is also clear-cut evidence of a significant improvement in the fit of the model compared to the models that omit the error components. 8 We thus conclude that the error components logit model is the superior choice for these data, and we proceed by calculating the respondent's marginal willingness-to-pay for energy savings using the coefficient estimates from this model.
Marginal willingness-to-pay and its Distribution
The household's WTP for decreasing the building's primary energy demand by one kWh can be derived as the marginal rate of substitution between investment cost and energy savings. For the calculation of the respondent's marginal WTP (MW T P ), we thus fix the representative utility V ij and take the total derivative of Equation (8):
Hence, individual MW T P can be expressed as the ratio of the cost and energysaving coefficients, including their interaction effects. Table 3 reports summary statistics of MW T P estimates obtained from the error components logit model. Eastern households exhibit a mean MW T P of e3.28 per kWh, while the mean western MW T P is considerably less at e1.72.
9 The much lower standard deviation indicates that the evaluation of energy savings among western households is fairly homogenous. Given that the immense discrepancy in 
MW T P within Germany is essentially a result of the special situation of Eastern
Germany's building stock, we consider the estimates obtained for western households to better reflect the prevailing MW T P in the post-unification period.
Policy Implications
The most recent financial support program of the German government to encourage retrofits allows households to not only apply for loans, but also provides grants for covering renovation expenses. Up to 10% of the investment cost are awarded, reaching a maximum of e5000 per dwelling. With individual MW T P estimates for energy savings and the associated investment cost in hand, we can approximate the share of households that would undertake the retrofit irrespectively of the financial support. Given that these households cannot be identified by the program authority in advance, they have an incentive to free ride on the grant.
An immediate challenge in gauging the extent of free-ridership returns us to the issue of how to account for hidden costs. We define a free-rider as a household whose individual WTP, calculated as the product of MW T P i × ∆Q ij , is greater than the sum of the observed plus hidden costs incurred from a particular retrofit: Starting with the special case of zero hidden cost, we designate the household as a free-rider if the inequality in Equation (10) holds. If we subsequently allow for increasingly higher hidden costs, a point will eventually be reached at which the inequality in Equation (10) becomes an equality. From this point on, the household would no longer be a free-rider, as its hidden costs are large enough such that the total cost exceed its WTP.
With these mechanics in hand, we can explore the sensitivity of the estimated free-rider share to different hypothetical levels of hidden costs for all alternatives.
Note that because the WTP estimates of households from eastern Germany are likely to be inflated due to the urgency of renovation following reunification, we consider in the following only the 2128 households located in western Germany.
We further restrict our attention to the western households that have a WTP that exceed the observed cost, since this this is a necessary condition for potential free-ridership. 10 Depending on the respective retrofit option, roughly 50% of the western households have a WTP ≥ observed cost, validating a similar result that was observed by Banfi et al. (2008) .
The abscissas of Figure 2 shows the hidden cost as a percent of the observed cost for two commonly chosen retrofit combinations. To facilitate interpretation, the hidden cost is expressed as a share of the observed cost, which for simplification of the exposition is assumed to be equal across households. For each level of 10 The remaining western households exhibit a WTP < observed cost, and hence can be excluded as free-riders at the outset. Moving to the right along the abscissa and increasing the hypothetical share of hidden cost increases the number of households for which the inequality in Equation (10) inflects, meaning that these households can no longer be classified as free-riders. For example, the most left bar of the histogram suggests that there are some 20 households for which their total cost exceed their WTP for a share of hidden cost between 0% and 5% of observed cost. Excluding these 20 households from the set of free-riders, the dashed line drops only slightly to 49% free-rider fraction. Moving further along the abscissa yields a further exclusion of households that are marked by the histogram. At its peak, which corresponds to a share of 50% hidden cost, the estimated fraction of free-riders is still non-negligible, reaching roughly 20% of the sample of western households. This fraction approaches zero only when the hidden cost comprises up to 100% of observed cost.
A similar pattern for a different retrofit alternative is seen in Figure 3 (b), which shows the roof-window-facade-heating option. Even when hidden costs comprise the sizeable share of 50% of observed costs, the corresponding share of free-riders is substantial at roughly 38%.
We thus conclude that our results call into question the logic of providing renovation grants to households. Nearly half of the households show a WTP larger than the required observed investment cost, a result that is reduced only marginally when hidden costs are taken into account. As such households cannot be identified in advance, the awarded grants are likely to be exposed to extensive free riding.
Conclusions
This paper has estimated willingness-to-pay for energy savings that accompany a building's retrofit. Using revealed choice data from a survey among German homeowners, we rely on the random-utility framework to capture individual and choice alternative attributes that determine the decision process. Starting with the standard conditional logit model, we augment the model's flexibility by first allowing for preference heterogeneity using the random parameters logit model, and second imposing a structure to capture correlation among the utility of the alternatives with the error components logit model. We find that the conditional and the random parameters logit model yield almost identical results, while the error components logit model gives the best fit to the data at hand. Thus, we conclude that the augmented flexibility of the random parameters logit model does not justify its higher computational costs with these data.
We completed the analysis by using the obtained marginal willingness-to-pay estimates and investment cost to generate insights into the extent to which freerider effects may undermine the social benefits of a financial support program.
We found that for some 50% of the households, the willingness-to-pay exceeds the observed cost, a share that drops only slightly when allowing for the possibility that households incur additional hidden costs.
Our findings are of special interest in Europe, given that a recent directive of the European Union requires that member states introduce political measures to decrease energy end-use by 9%. To the extent that measures such as Germany's grants program suffer from extensive free-riding -and our results suggest that they do -an immediate issue arises as to whether these political targets should recognize free-rider effects, and make corresponding adjustments. The analysis presented in this paper provides the first step in articulating such an adjustment by quantifying the magnitude of the problem. Having done so, two useful endeavors for future research emerge. The first would involve devising methodological approaches for quantifying the level of hidden costs associated with renovation activities, perhaps by drawing on experimental techniques. The second extension would estimate the determinants of free-riding, with the ultimate aim of identifying options for excluding free-riders from program participation by means such as market discrimination.
